

REPORTED UNOFFICIALLY TO THE EMPEROR ON 14 Nov. 1941.

## Outline of the Latest Developments of Japanese-American Negotiations

1. Instruction sent to Ambassador NOMURA.
2. Progress of negotiations in Washington
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  - b. Nov. 10 NOMURA-ROOSEVELT Conversation
3. Developments in Tokyo
  - a. Nov. 10 Talk between Foreign Minister TOGO and the U.S. Ambassador
  - b. Nov. 11 Talk between Foreign Minister TOGO and the British Ambassador

## 1. Instruction sent to Ambassador NOMURA:

Japan's counter-proposal on Japanese-American negotiations, on which an Imperial decision was received in the presence of the Emperor on November 5th, was dispatched on the same day to Ambassador NOMURA by telegram. In view of the negotiations, which had already lasted half a year since its commencement, Japan has been making concession after concession, bearing the unbearable, in order to reach a compromise quickly. In spite of this, America has not only shown no friendly reaction but held firmly to her original opinion. It is because of our sincerest desire to maintain peace that we have thus made difficult concessions, displaying our sincerity to the utmost. However, there is a limit to our patience. If our existence and prestige are at stake, we must defend them if necessary regardless of the sacrifice. Should the U.S. still take an attitude to disregard our position, we shall have to consider that there is no ground left for further negotiation. With the negotiation approaching its final stage, we have instructed him to notify the U.S. that she should take proper measures by reconsidering the situation from a broader viewpoint upon the present situation that does not permit of even a day's delay.

## 2. Negotiations in Washington.

- a. Meeting between Ambassador NOMURA and Secretary of State Hull (Nov. 7.)

Ambassador NOMURA, accompanied by Minister WAKASUGI, called on Secretary of State Hull and explained carefully Japan's position

and determination. He was also under instruction to reach a compromise at the earliest date possible on the three chief pending questions. Among the three main pending questions, i.e., non-preferential treatment of commerce, Tripartite Pact and withdrawal of troops, the first two could roughly be brought to a compromise by our present proposal. Regarding the stationing of the troops, we earnestly wish that in view of a maximum concession made by Japan, in spite of great hardships, U.S. would take a far-sighted view of the prevailing situations from a broader standpoint.

To this, Secretary of State Hull, after reading our counter-proposal, is reported to have answered to the following effect:

The question of non-preferential treatment is acceptable. As to the stationing of the troops, he simply asked in what proportions the withdrawal and the stationing will be made. Regarding the question of self-defense in connection with the Tripartite Pact he stated that they would give an answer in due course after studying the question.

Further, on this occasion, the Secretary of State asked, as his personal question, what Japan would think, if the highest authorities of China should pledge her friendship and confidence to the Japanese Government as well as to its nation and wish for the restoration of friendly relationship between Japan and China. He wished it to be conveyed to the Japanese Government to inquire about its intention.

This proposal may be interpreted as hinting at the U.S.'s intention of leaving the question of the withdrawal of troops in China to a direct negotiation between Japan and China, since this has been the most difficult point in the negotiation. If so, we may be able to get a chance, as has been Japan's wish from the beginning, of solving the China Incident through direct negotiations between Japan and China without any intervention by a third power. We, therefore, instructed Ambassador NOMURA on November 9 that he should take necessary steps to enable us to avail ourselves of this proposal, on condition that the U.S. would delay the execution of items of agreement on questions other than the China question until the making of peace between Japan and China, and that she would, during this period, refrain from actions of assisting CHIANG.

b. Meeting between President Roosevelt and Ambassador NOMURA (Nov. 10)

Ambassador NOMURA met President Roosevelt and explained as follows: Six months have already elapsed since the commencement of Japanese-American negotiations, and during this time, Japan has endured the unbearable and made many concessions. In spite of this, the U. S. Government has strongly adhered to its original

proposal without making any concessions. There are people in our country who entertain doubts as regards the real intentions of the U.S. Therefore, from the viewpoint of earnestly desiring peace, the Japanese Government has made the maximum concession in the three questions which were the most difficult points heretofore in the negotiations.

However, the President did not immediately express agreement or denial. He stated the following only in an abstract manner: At the present time the whole world is in a critical condition because of disturbances caused by acts of aggressions. Our good sense hopes fervently that the world would soon return to the proper course of peace. The object of the U.S. Government lies in exerting its best efforts to bring about peace in the Pacific Ocean areas through the spirit of fair play. I hope that these preliminary conversations will favorably result in becoming the basis of the negotiations. The U.S. expects to check the expansion of war, and establish a permanent peace.

He added in connection with the principle of non-discrimination that the world generally hopes that it would be carried out.

When Ambassador NOMURA stated that the U.S. economic pressure against Japan is exciting the Japanese people, the President said that the people sometimes require a so-called "modus vivendi" in order to live, and that this should be translated "mode of living."

In reference to the above, it is to our surprise and regret that the U.S. Government in this negotiation still continues adhering to the attitude of not emerging from the bounds of preliminary conversations. We keenly felt that this is most unbecoming at the present pressing situation which requires the speedy conclusion of the negotiation. Therefore, on the 11th, instructions were again sent to Ambassador NOMURA ordering him to take steps to try to urge the U.S. Government to deeply reconsider this point. Also, on the 12th, close attention of the U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo was also called to this point.

### 3. Negotiations in Tokyo.

#### a. Conversation with the U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo (Nov. 10)

A general exchange of opinions was already carried out with the U.S. Ambassador on the 30th of October, but I met him again on the 10th and stated as follows:

After studying the past progress, what I feel keenly is the insufficient understanding of facts on the part of the U.S. The Japanese-American negotiations have been postponed time and again. In the meantime, we have made as much concessions as possible to the U.S. contentions, regardless of which the U.S. has firmly adhered to her first contentions without yielding a step. In some points she has even reversed her attitude. Consequently,

there are people on our side who even doubt the sincerity of the U. S. Government, and public feeling will not tolerate any further delay.

I referred to the approaching Diet session and explained the urgency of the situation. I strongly requested that the U.S. Government solve the problem at a single stroke from a wide point of view, and explained point by point our last (T.N. Saigo-an) proposal. I also emphasized the following effect: In some cases, economic pressure can result in offering a deeper threat than that by force of arms. Also, in regard to the China problem, for Japan, it is tantamount to suicide to tamely accept terms which ignore the results of four and a half years' of sacrifice. Since public opinion would never allow this, I fervently hope that the U.S. would consider this point fully.

I requested him to transmit the above to his Government. The U.S. Ambassador replied that he would cable the above to his Government immediately as he, too, has the desire to exert all his efforts for the adjustment of Japanese-American relations.

b. Conversation with the British Ambassador in Tokyo (Nov 11)

On both the 29th and 30th of October, I also explained in detail to the British Ambassador, Craigie, the necessity of an immediate satisfactory conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation. I heard that the Ambassador reported the above to his Government. When I met the Ambassador on November 11, he referred to it, so I stated the following effect:

Negotiations have already entered the main phase, and now by submitting (T. N. Asigo-Teki) Japan's counter-proposal of a final nature, it has now entered the final phase. It would be proper for Britain to cooperate so as to guide the negotiations to success. If the U.S. accepts our proposal, the signing is possible within a week to ten days. And, if unfortunately, the U.S. rejects this, there is no possibility of continuing the negotiation. Besides, our domestic situation is such that it will not allow further delay in this negotiation. Since there should be methods for a speedy and satisfactory conclusion, depending upon the attitudes of the U.S. and Britain, I hope that the British Government would also give the above matter her fullest consideration and exert efforts for the speedy conclusion of this negotiation.

The ambassador seemed to have had the impression that this negotiation was still in the preliminary stage, and through my explanation, he seemed to have become aware for the first time of the urgency of the situation. He left after replying that he wishes to exert his best efforts in cooperating for a break in the deadlock.

C E R T I F I C A T E

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief,

Archives Section, THE FOREIGN OFFICE

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of (11) pages, dated 14 November, 1941, and described as follows: OUTLINE OF THE RECENT PROGRESS ON U.S.-JAPANESE NEGOTIATION.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Archives Section, THE FOREIGN OFFICE

Signed at Tokyo on this

26th day of January, 1948

/s/ K. Hayashi

Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ K. Urabe

Chief, Archives Section

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Henry Shimojima, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this

26th day of January, 1948

/s/ Henry Shimojima

NAME

Witness: /s/ J. G. Lambert

Investigator, IPS

Official Capacity

求底文：算學、音韻、卜筮（會學、能學）

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日本教育、政治、經濟、社會

外 德 志

1. 盧正興(1949) 三(4) 60

[illegible]

Figure 4. 1000000

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

2 3 4

$\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{4}$

三、度日如年 (2)

6191

1945年12月14日 中國人民解放軍

2. 图 4-10

第 2 章 数据库系统概论

1.  $\frac{1}{x^2} = x^{-2}$

[illegible]

J.P.S. due. 10.3105(4)

Exhibit No.

P. 2

二、華僑之政治生活

(甲)野村不便 此 野村金(1900)

[illegible]

我乃好學人、故、之、無、異、則、皆、通、問、答、之、意、  
 有、事、之、經、上、之、經、之、野、之、藏、外、之、經、其、外、之、經、  
 合、之、以、之、一、之、傳、同、之、又、之、傳、同、之、傳、同、之、傳、  
 確、同、與、之、傳、之、所、定、上、同、各、之、一、之、傳、  
 之、傳、之、傳、之、傳、

向井野郎氏長官、白令海、鄂畢、大連、旅順、  
那、最爲雄偉なる日本、及び帝國、の、  
、東部、の、海、の、主、權、を、  
國、の、自、復、一、解、を、示、す、

J. P. S. Doc. No. 3105 (4)

P. 3

ト顧問シ右ヲ日本政府ニ伝達シ其ノ意嚮ヲ同合  
サシト述ベタルヲ

右提言ハ米國側ニ於テ從來支那ノ於ルニ撤兵問題  
ノ交渉ノ最大難關ナリニ鑑ミ之ヲ自互間直接  
商議ニ委ネントス其意嚮ヲ及カセシムルモ解セ  
ル若シ然ラハ帝國志ヲ初メテ主張シ通リテ鄰事  
ニ及ボ三國ノ妨害ナリト互同ニ直接交渉ニヨリ解  
決ス機会ヲ得ルヲ認ムルヲ十一月九日野  
村大使對シ米側カ日支和平成立ヲ見込ム支那  
問題以外ノ各諸事項ノ實施ヲ遲延セシムル及此  
商談將ナラズ差控フニシテ條件トシ右提言  
ヲ利用スル意速措置直方訓令致スルヲ

J.P. Saloe. No. 3105 (4)

P. 4

(2)「口文」上大統領野村大使會談(十月十日)  
野村大使、「大統領」會見、日本交河、開始以來既  
ニ六月ヲ經過シ此帝國、難、又、戦争、會  
子、之、に拘、る、本國政府、原案、國、執、之、讓、る、我、國  
ニ於、る、本國、一、意見、即、此、二、方、より、疑、う、者、之、に、是、處、本國  
政府、の、平和、の、意、見、を、之、に、見、地、より、彼、本、交、河、ニ、於、て、五  
要、難、點、より、三、問題、三、國、之、最大、限、讓、り、行、へ、ん、  
た、次第、ヲ、説明、シ、テ、御、座、に、在、る、大統領、直、之、に  
對、し、テ、手、カ、ス、唯、抽、象、的、ニ、現在、金、世界、に、在、る、力、ニ、依、  
生、じ、て、福、を、為、さ、る、能、は、二、倍、より、五、倍、ノ、常識、ハ、  
在、界、カ、平和、ノ、常、道、ニ、對、シ、テ、復、歸、シ、テ、之、ヲ、欲、ス、本國  
政府、の、目的、ハ、一、方、ニ、一、方、ニ、對、シ、テ、不、平、等、也、域  
ニ、平和、の、意、見、を、最、善、に、盡、ス、ニ、本、件、豫、備、的、會  
談、ヲ、交、河、ノ、基、礎、ト、シ、テ、其、後、十、日、ノ、良好、ノ、結果、ヲ、得、ル、ニ、テ、上、布  
治、ス、本國、の、所、謂、不、平、等、ノ、戰爭、ノ、擴大、ヲ、防止、シ、恒、久、の、平  
和、ノ、確、立、ニ、テ、上、述、ノ、無、差、別、原則、ニ、依、テ、之、ハ、金、世界、一般、ニ  
在、カ、行、ハ、レ、ル、ニ、テ、上、述、之、に、日、語、言、ハ、野、村、大、使、來  
國、ノ、對、日、經濟、作、道、ハ、我、國、民、ノ、敵、目、也、之、ヲ、一、  
中、述、ス、之、に、國、際、之、同、大統領、ハ、國民、ノ、生、キ、ニ、為、ニ、  
モ、一、タ、ス、之、カ、之、ヲ、一、要、也、之、に、依、テ、在、ハ、其、之、カ、  
譯、ス、之、ヲ、一、要、也、之、に、依、テ、在、ハ、其、之、カ、  
在、對、シ、テ、本國政府、カ、今、以、交、河、ニ、對、シ、テ、之、ヲ、  
豫、備、的、會、談、ノ、域、ニ、テ、之、ヲ、カ、ル、ヤ、能、ハ、之、ヲ、指、導、ス、之、に、上、述、  
方、願、ハ、意、外、且、遺憾、之、に、所、ニ、交、河、ノ、意、見、を、盡、ス、





INFORMAL REPORT TO EMPEROR OF Nov. 20, 1941.

The other day I reported to you the summary of the details of the negotiations conducted at Washington and Tokyo subsequent to the despatch of the Imperial (T.N. Japanese) Government's instructions (5th). Today, however, I shall report to you the subsequent developments.

Talks were held four times, viz. on the 12th, 15th, 17th and 18th, but as it just so happened that Ambassador KURUSU arrived at Washington on the 15th, the said Ambassador participated also in the negotiations on both the 17th and 18th, together with Ambassador NOMURA.

(1) Parley between Ambassador NOMURA and Secretary of State Hull of the 12th.

Notwithstanding the fact that the 11th fell on Armistice Day, the U.S. State Department deliberated the whole day on the proposal submitted by our side (T.N. Japan), and on the 12th Secretary of State Hull handed the following two notes to Ambassador NOMURA (accompanied by Minister WAKASUGI) who visited him on the 12th, viz. (A) A note expressing the desire of having our (T.N. Japanese) new Cabinet also confirm the opinion manifested to the U.S. Government by the KONOE Cabinet on August 28 in regard to the Pacific policy entertained by it, as well as (B) A note confirming Secretary of State Hull's personal suggestion made to Ambassador NOMURA on the 7th in regard to the China Problem, viz. the proposal of having both Japan and China mutually exchange oaths for the sake of establishing truly amicable and cooperative relations. On that occasion he (Hull) appears to have orally hinted his intention of acting as a mediator between Japan and China. Furthermore, in regard to the stationing of troops in China, the Secretary of State expressed his opposition to the permanent or indefinite stationing of troops, and he is said to have repeatedly criticized Hitlerism by stating that, as for the Japan-Germany-Italy Tripartite Pact, it was inconsistent for Japan to stand in alliance with Germany on one hand while advocating a Pacific policy on the other, and that there would no longer be any need for Japan to remain in the Tripartite Pact in the event of a Pacific Ocean Peace Agreement being conducted.

With regard to the foregoing, the Government made Ambassador NOMURA reply that, as for (A), the items regarding which the U.S. desires confirmation are all embodied in our Proposal and that the present Government also has no objection in confirming same in the spirit thereof; however, the satisfactory conclusion of the present negotiations should be made the preamble, so that it would be obvious that not our side only (T.N. Japan) should suffer any restraint in the event of the negotiations ending, by any chance, in a rupture. As for (B) the said Ambassador was instructed to be on his strict guard not to bring about a delay in the negotiations by complicating the situation thereby as same was accepted (T.N. for consideration) by our side from the standpoint of bringing about a break in the deadlock.

(2) Parley between Ambassador NOMURA and Secretary of State Hull of the 15th.

Secretary of State Hull presented two notes relative to the question of Commerce. Of these, (A) expatiates on the point that, whereas our Final Proposal (T.N. Saigo-an) (Proposal A) stated "In the event of the Principle of Non-Discrimination being applied throughout the entire world, the enforcement of this principle in the entire Pacific area, also including China, is approved," it is desired that, by taking into consideration the U.S. policy of endeavoring to remove trade barriers, Japan also withdraws the stipulation regarding "Application throughout the Entire World, etc." as the United States cannot hold itself responsible for countries outside of its own jurisdiction.

Proposal "B" is styled the "Proposal re Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration regarding Economic Policy" and is made up of the three parts of (1) General Policy, (2) Japan-U.S. Relations, and (3) Policy for the Pacific Area. (1) states that both Japan and the U.S. should cooperate in restoring the freedom of commerce throughout the world, (2) stipulates the restoration of normal relations between the two nations in regard to commerce, finance and economy, and the concluding of a commercial treaty, whereas (3) specifies that full control rights should be returned to China in regard to economy, finance and currency; preferential or monopolistic rights shall not be acquired in China; and that the joint economic exploitation of China shall be engaged in through the cooperation of the Powers. After receiving the foregoing, Ambassador NOMURA promised to transmit same to his Government, at the same time drawing the attention of the U.S. side to the fact that it was improper to consider the present negotiations as being still in the stage of Preliminary Talks inasmuch as same had already entered into the main stage. Against this the Secretary of State is said to have strongly persisted in his stand that they were still Preliminary Talks and that it would be more proper to enter upon Japan-U.S. negotiations after first of all discovering the basis for negotiations through the preliminary talks between Japan and America and consulting with interested nations like Britain, Netherlands and China, etc.

On that occasion, Ambassador NOMURA is said to have done his utmost in explaining that a Japan-U.S. Agreement and the Tripartite Pact would not be conflicting as the Secretary of State repeated his suspicions regarding Japan's peaceful intentions and went on to dwell on the Tripartite Pact by repeatedly expressing his strong desire to have the said Pact made extinct or a dead letter as there should be no need for Japan to preserve it in the event of a Japan-U.S. Agreement becoming concluded. In brief, the United States assumed the attitude that the views of the U.S. regarding the other pending questions, viz. the Tripartite Pact and the problems of stationing troops would be presented after receiving our reply to the aforementioned two notes.

With regard to the aforesaid two notes, Ambassador NOMURA was instructed to reply to the U.S. that, as regards "Application throughout the Entire

World, etc. ....," inasmuch as it is our desire to have the said principle applicable uniformly throughout the entire world, we have made it our condition to agree to the enforcement of the said principle also in China in sympathy with the realization of the said desire, so that, by taking into account the fact that this principle is being practically ignored at the present day, we cannot agree to same being made applicable at first only to China. As for Proposal (B), by utilizing the fact that this is styled a tentative plan also by the U.S., we have instructed Ambassador NOMURA to have the U.S. withdraw same completely and to arrange with the U.S. authorities to expedite the negotiations on the basis of our Final Proposal (T.N. Saigo-an), especially on the ground that the various clauses dealing with the Pacific Area ignore the actual conditions in China, and especially as Clause 3 (the proposal regarding Joint Exploitation of China) is liable to become the first step toward International Control of China.

(3) Parley between Ambassadors NOMURA and KURUSU, President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull of the 17th.

Accompanied by Ambassador KURUSU, Ambassador NOMURA first of all visited Secretary of State Hull, and after a meeting of about 30 minutes, all of them had an interview with President Roosevelt.

It is reported that on Ambassador KURUSU explaining that a clash between Japan and the U.S. would not be beneficial to anyone, the President concurred with this view and stated that the situation could be saved by formulating a general understanding. On the said Ambassador furthermore emphasizing Japan's peaceful intentions and explaining her (T.N. Japan's) position as regards the Tripartite Pact, as well as the difficulties centering around the question of stationing of troops, to this, the President is said to have replied that he had heard about the difficulties regarding the China problem and that the U.S. has no intention of interfering or assisting in the matter but is merely desirous of becoming only an introducer. During the meeting, which lasted as long as an hour and a quarter, the President is said to have displayed a friendly attitude, but materially no special compromise was seen.

(4) Parley between Ambassadors NOMURA and KURUSU and Secretary of State Hull of the 18th.

Secretary of State Hull emphasized the menace of Hitlerism, adding that the peace policy of the U.S. was incompatible with same and that, inasmuch as it would be most difficult to adjust the U.S.-Japan relations as long as Japan joins hands with Germany, it was impossible to make any progress in the parleys between Japan and the U.S. without first of all eliminating this basic obstacle. Both Ambassadors gave their replies as deemed fit to the occasion and as there would be no limit to discussions on such a basic problem at a time when conditions had become so tense, both Ambassadors proposed on their own, with a view to planning to alleviate the situation in the Southwest Pacific, to have conditions restored as they were prior to the enforcement of the Freezing Act, by Japan withdrawing her troops from French Indo-China and by the U.S. rescinding the Freezing Act.

After being prevailed on in turn by both Ambassadors, the Secretary of State is said to have replied that, in the event of it being made clear that the heads of the Japanese Government are truly earnest in pursuing a pacific policy, he did not mind seizing this opportunity to persuade Britain and the Netherlands, etc. to restore conditions to the days prior to the enforcement of the Freezing Act. He (T.N. Secretary of State Hull) remarked that it was necessary, however, for the political conditions in Japan to proceed toward an increasingly peaceful trend.

Against the foregoing, both Ambassadors NOMURA and KURUSU expressed the opinion that, at this time, when the United States was about to venture on the Atlantic War by revising the Neutrality Act, it would be most advantageous for Japan to evade a rupture in the Japan-U.S. relations and prepare herself for future activities by pulling herself out of the present crisis by standing aloof from the theater of war. However, by concluding that the various circumstances made the Tentative Plan of both Ambassadors insufficient to ensure the safety of Japan's position, the Government instructed both Ambassadors at midnight of the 19th to immediately present to the U.S. authorities the Proposal "B" that was decided on at the meeting held in the Imperial presence the other day.

C E R T I F I C A T E

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief, Archives Section, THE FOREIGN OFFICE

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of (11) pages, dated 20 November, 1941, and described as follows: OUTLINE OF THE RECENT PROGRESS ON U.S.-JAPANESE NEGOTIATION.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Archives Section, THE FOREIGN OFFICE

Signed at Tokyo on this

26th day of January, 1948

/s/ K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ K. Urabe

Chief, Archives Section  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Henry Shimojima, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this

26th day of January, 1948

/s/ Henry Shimojima  
NAME

Witness: /s/ J. G. Lambert

Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity

Exhibit No.

J.P.S. & Loc. No. 3105(5)

# 日米交渉經過概要

(二六二三)

## 外務省

過日、帝國政府訓令發出(五日)ニ引續キ華府及東京ニ於テ行ハシタル交渉経緯ヲ概畧御説明シテ、本日、其、后、經過ヲ御報告申シテ了ス。

会谈ハ十二日、十五日、十六日及十八日、四回行ハシテ、恰モ來栖大使カ十五日午後華府ニ到着致シテ、十七、十八兩日、同大使ニ野村大使ト共ニ交渉ニ参加致シテ居リス。

(一) 十二日 野村大使「ハル」長官会谈  
十二日ハ休戰記念日ニ當リタルニ拘ラス米國國務省、我方、提示セル案ヲ終日審議タル由、如「ハル」長官ハ十三日往訪セル野村大使(若杉公使兼同)ニ對シニ通、文書即(四)八月十八日近衛内閣、其抱懷スル平和的政策ニ関シ米國政府ニ對シテ表明セル見解ヲ我新内閣ニ於テモ確認アリクニ言テ認メタル文書及(四)七日「ハル」長官カ夫レ問題ニ関シ野村大使ニ對シテ為シタル個人的提言即日米兩國カ眞、友好協力關係ヲ樹立スル爲相立ニ誓約ヲ交換スル案ヲ認メタル文書ヲ手交シミシク、其際陪ニ日米間、橋渡シタル意アルヲ、如モ口吻ヲ減ラシテ趣キアリマス 尚長官

J.P.S. doc. No. 3105(5)

ハ支那駐兵問題ニ関シハ永久乃至無期限駐兵ニ反対  
述（日独伊三國條約ニ付テハ日本カ一方ニ平和的政策ヲ  
標榜シツ他方独逸ト同盟関係ニセラハ身價ニシテ太  
平洋平和協定成立セハ日本ハ三國條約ニ留ムル必要  
ナラベシト述ヘ頻リニ「コントラ」主義ヲ論難シテ由テ  
御座居マス。

右ニ対シマシテハ政府ハ野村大使ニ対シ（甲）ニ付テハ米側  
ノ確認ヲ希望スル事項ハ我方提案中ニ全部包含  
セリ居ルモノニシテ現政府ニ於テモ其趣旨ニ於テ之ヲ確  
認スルニ異議ナシ但シ右ハ今次交渉成立ヲ前提ト  
シ從テ萬一交渉不調ノ際ハ我方ノ拘束ヲ受ク  
ルコトナキハ當然ノ儀ナルコトヲ米側ニ同答セシメ（乙）ニ付  
テハ当方ニ於テハ右ヲ交渉ノ局面打開即チ結促進ノ見  
地ヨリ取上ケタルモノナルニ付之ニ依リ局面ヲ紛糾セシメ文  
交渉遷延セテ来スル如キコトナキ様嚴重戒心方同大使ニ  
訓令致シマシ。

### （二十五）野村大使ハル長官会談

「ハル」長官ハ通商問題ニ関スルニ通シ文書ヲ提示  
シマシ（甲）ハ我方最良案（甲案）ニ於テ「無差別  
原則」カ全世界ニ適用セラルルモノナルニ於テハ太平洋  
全地域即チ支那ニ於テモ本原則ノ行ハルルコトヲ承認  
ス「トアリタルニ対シテ米國トシテハ管轄國以外ノ國ニ  
対シ責任ヲ負ヒ得サルヲ以テ通商障壁ヲ除去セシ  
トスル米國ノ政策ニ鑑ミ日本側ニ於テモ全世界適用

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云々、條件、撤回アリ、イキ旨ヲ傳達スルニ付、(3)「経済政策ニ関スル日本共同宣言書」ニ掲グ(1)「建設案」(2)「日本関係」(3)「太平洋地域ニ於テノ政策」三部合ヨリ成リ、(1)「日本兩國協力ニ基キテ進ム通商自由、恢復、計リ」(2)「兩國、通商、財政、及シ、經濟上、正常関係恢復通商條約、締結等」規定。(3)「經濟、財政、通貨、関スル完全ニ主權ヲ支那ニ返還スベキコト、又而シテ冷々ニ優待的乃至独占的權利ヲ獲得セザルニシテ、列國、協力、下ニ支那、經濟共同開發、行フコト等ヲ記載スル」云々アリ又





明ニ示ス於テ、石ヲ機縁トシ長官ハ英、蘭等ヲ説キ凍結令  
 実施前、狀態ニ復歸シ差支テ但シ之ニ依リ日本、政情ヲ益々  
 平和的傾向ニ回フ様ニ爲コト所望ナリト答ヘテ趣キテリマス。  
 石國多野村、末廣兩大使ヨリ米國カ合ヤ中、立派ヲ改正  
 シ大西洋戦争ニ乘出ストル此際日本トシテ、石試案ニ依リ  
 日米、破局ヲ回避シ戦乱、外ニ立ケツク現下、危局ヲ切抜ケ以  
 他日、雄飛ニ備ヘコト得策ナリト、密見身申カケリシ  
 多政府ニ於テ、諸般、情勢ヨリ兩大使、試案ヲ以テシテ、米  
 國、立場ヲ安固ナラシムニ足ルモノト認メ十九日深更兩大  
 使對シ過般市前會議決定、乙案ヲ至急米側ニ對シ提示  
 在様訓令致シタリ。

I.R.J. Doc. No. 3105 (5)

# 證明書

「フエント」文書局 第 三 號  
國際檢察部 第三一。五號(五)

典據及び公正に關する証明

余、林聲、余が下記之資格ニ於テ、即チ外務省文書課長トシテ、日本政府ト公的関係ニ在ルモノトシテ、該官吏トシテ、余が茲ニ添附セラルル十一頁ヨリ成ル千九百四十八年/昭和十六年十二月二十日附、下記題名、即チ日米交渉經過概要、文書ノ保管ニ任シ居ルモノトシテ証明ス。  
余、更に添附ノ記録及び文書が日本政府ノ公文書ナルコト、並ニ右ノ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式書類及ビ綴一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。(右ノア、總番号又ハ引用基、他公式書類又ハ綴ニ於ケル該文書、成規所定、公式の綴ヲモ將記スベシ) 外務省文書課

千九百四十八年/昭和二十三年一月二十六日

東京ニ於テ署名

富田該官吏署名欄

右ノ者ノ公的資格

證人

林聲

聲

署名捺印

外務省文書課長

浦部勝馬

署名捺印

URABE Katsuma

公式入手ニ關スル証明

余、(亨利・シムジマ) 余が聯合國最古の指揮官總司令部ニ關係シモ、今ノコト、並ニ上記題名ノ文書、余が公的ニ日本政府ノ上記署名官吏ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百四十八年/昭和二十三年一月二十六日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏 名 署名欄

右ノ者ノ公的資格

證人

(亨利・シムジマ)

署名

HENRY SHIMJIMA

國際檢察部 調查官

ギエー・ラバート

G. LAMBERT

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